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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW VL
HE DIED INTESTATE AND,
By
JOHN WOODCOCK, JR.*
"Well, you see he died intestate and, of course-," but a vendor of real
estate never does see. He has either been in possession of this land for twenty-one
years or more, or he has rented it for a like period and kept all of the rent. Now,
some smart lawyer starts telling him that he has only an undivided one-third
interest in the premises because there were two other heirs, whom he has neither
seen nor heard from in lo these many years, and that his deed to the premises is
not acceptable. That, in brief, is the problem raised by the fact that the heirs take
under the intestate law as tenants in common. It is a problem which, although
not a frequent one, is one which occurs often enough to merit some discussion.
The rule of law which has placed our unhappy heir in this position is that
when a tenant in commoni enters into possession of premises exclusively he has
entered into the possession presumptively for the benefit of all of the tenants.
The solution of this problem raises three questions: First, may a tenant in common
acquire title to the entire estate by adverse possession? Second, if he may, is his title
so acquired a marketable title, and third, if not, what can be done in Pennsylvania
to straighten out such a predicament?
The presumption noted above is the first stumbling block. In order to acquire
title by adverse possession there must be open, notorious and hostile possession for
the statutory period. This means that the burden of proof which rests on the person
asserting adverse possession when that person is a tenant in common is much greater
than it is in other cases. In the ordinary case the possession is presumed to be ad-
verse if had for the statutory period, and it is incumbent upon the party claiming
otherwise.to show that the possession was not adverse, but was permissive. A tenant
in common, however, must establish the fact that his use was adverse.1 If the ten-
ant in common is able to show an actual ouster of the other tenant, then the statutory
period will begin to run.2 but, in our case, an actual ouster is out of the question.
Our heir has only vaguely heard of these two folks out in the west somewhere.
The Pennsylvania cases have, however, made this problem one that is not insur-
mountable. In Law v. Patterson3 the court stated, "A man might come in by a right-
ful possession, and yet hold over adversely in the title. If he does so, such holding
over, under circumstances will be equivalent to an actual ouster. -In order
*Member of Blair County Bar and Pennsylvania Bar Association.
1 Hanley v. Steward, 155 Pa. Super. 535, 39 A.2d 323 (1944); Smith v. Kingsley, 331 Pa. .10,
200 A. 11 (1938).
2 Keyser v. Evans, 30 Pa. 507 (1858); Conneaut Lake Park Inc. v. Klinginsmith, 362 Pa. 592,
66 A.2d 88 (1949).
8 1 W. & S. 184 (1841).
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to prove that one tenant in common has claimed the whole 'exclusively, it is not re-
quisite that he should be proved to have made an expressed declaration to that
effect; for it may be shown as clearly from his actions as from his words. For
this purpose it will be sufficient to show that he entered upon the whole of the
land, and took possession thereof, as if it had been his own exclusively; and that
he has continued to occupy the whole, either by himself or his tenants, and to re-
ceive the whole of the rents, issues, and profits arising from the same, for twenty-
one years, without having accounted to his co-tenant for any portion thereof, or any
demand being shown to have been made upon him to do so, or evidence given of
his having acknowledged the claim of his co-tenant."
It is true that he has a presumption to overcome, but as was said in the case
of Smith v. Kingsley,4 "The presumption that one co-tenant holds possession of
property for the benefit of all of his co-tenants has no more force than any othe-r
kind of presumption. As we said in Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co. 315 Pa. 497,
173 A. 644: 'Presumptions are not evidence and should not be substituted for evi-
dence. No presumption can be evidence; it is a rule about the duty of producing
evidence. Presumptions are not fact suppliers; they are guide posts indicating whence
proof must come." The Smith case is one of the most recent cases in which a tenant
in common has acquired title by adverse possession as against his co-tenant. In that
case one of the co-tenants had leased the coal rights in certain premises, reserving
for himself the right to take out coal for his own benefit. The lease was made in
1828 and was to last one hundred years. At its expiration heirs of the other tenants
contended that when the lease was made it was presumptively for the benefit
of their ancestors and that, therefore, when the lease expired they retained an inter-
est in the coal. The court found, however, that the giving of the lease was an actual
ouster, and that these heirs were barred by the running of the statute. The giving of
a deed by one tenant is an ouster of the other tenants. 5 However, that is the very
thing that our man cannot do, for the vendee has refused to accept his deed. It is
necessary for him to prove adverse possession so that he may tender a good, market-
able deed. And the important fact to our problem is that such adverse possession
can be proved not only by showing an actual ouster of the co-tenants for twenty-
one years or more but also by introducing evidence showing positive and unequivo-
cal acts amounting to a claim of the whole property as exclusively his, brought
home to the co-heirs and co-tenants twenty-one years or more and maintained
without interruption. 6
Providing such facts are available the next problem which faces the approval
of this title is this: Is such a title marketable, for it is a well established rule of law
that the vendee to a contract for the sale of real estate need not accept the deed
or pay the purchase price upon tender of the deed if the title to the premises is
4 331 Pa. 10, 200 A. 11 (1938).




not marketable. A glance at the cases on this point would seem to indicate that
the answer is in the affirmative, for in Medusa Portland Cement Company v.
Lamantina,7 the court stated, "It is a familiar principal of the law of real estate
that a title depending on adverse possession may constitute not only a good but a
marketable title which a purchaser will be compelled to accept." Other Pennsyl-
vania cases bolster this position. 8 However, an examination of these cases will re-
veal that, in all of them, the facts establishing adverse possession were definite
and provable and that the case of Hoover v. Pontz9 more correctly states the law.
It is there stated that a court should not declare a title marketable if there be a
color of an outstanding title which may prove substantial. If the purchaser runs
the hazard of litigation in the future a court should not declare a title marketable.
As the court says, "It is undoubtedly true, a good title may be acquired by adverse
possession and in exceptional cases, a marketable title, which a purchaser may be re-
quired to accept. The instances in which it may be compelled are rare, however,
because proof of open, notorious, continuous, visible, and hostile possession neces-
sarily rest in parol and 'where the title depends on the existence of a fact which is
not a matter of record, and the fact depends for its proof entirely on oral evidence,
the case must be made very clear by the vendor to warrant the court in ordering
specific performance.' "10
The court in the Hoover case refused to grant specific performance. Instead
the court suggested that the vendor ought to use the means then given him by the
legislature' to clear his title before they would force the vendee to accept it. This
suggestion made by this case is one which should find favor in our case. A tenant
in common has, it seems, an additional burden of proof when he claims the whole
of the estate through adverse possession, and it seems that his title would not be
marketable when he himself is trying to sell the whole premises unless he has first
used the means given him in Pennsylvania by the Action to Quiet Title. Once he
has used this means his title will be marketable. In American Jurisprudence12 it is
said, "a marketable title may be based on a judicial sale or decree quieting the title,
providing the proceedings were regular and all persons in interest were parties
thereto so as to be bound thereby." The important feature, and the one to be watch-
ed is that of making all parties in interest parties to the suit, for, "when the
vendor's title depends upon the validity of the judicial proceedings and a defect
rendering the title doubtful is apparent from the record of the proceedings the
vendee need go no further than merely pointing it out; but if, on the other hand,
the defect depends upon extrinsic facts to overcome any presumption as to the
regularity of the proceedings he must produce 'evidence to establish his claim in
7 353 Pa. 53, 44 A.2d 244 (1945).
8 See Westfall v. Washlagel, 200 Pa. 181 (1901); Dallmeyer v. Ferguson, 198 Pa. 288 (1901);
Pratt v. Eby, 67 Pa. 396 (1871).
9 271 Pa. 285, 114 A. 522 (1921).
10 Ibid. page 288.
11 At that time the Act of April 18, 1905, P.L. 202, or by means of a Bill Quia Timet.
12 55 AM. JUR. 678-680, § 220.
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this regard." However, in this regard, the power of a court to make a decree con-
cerning land must be distinguished from questions as to errors respecting facts
or law going to the merits of the issue presented. An error respecting these latter
matters does not affect the jurisdiction of the court and the titl-e of the vendor is
marketable.
13
The Action to Quiet Title is, in Pennsylvania today, the proper method for
our heir to follow. He is in possession and there is a definite cloud on his title.
This action is at least an action quasi-in-rem to determine interests in property and
'he judgment will be conclusive upon those persons named as defendants. As is
-itated in the Res'atemetnt, Judgments,14 "Where in a proceeding quasi-in-rem to
'letet'mine inttrests in property a competent court has, after proper notice to the
defendant, determined the interests in the property as between the plaintiff and
the defendant, and the Court has jurisdiction over the property, the judgment i',
!)inding upon the defendant with respect to the property although the defendant
was not personally subject to the jurisdiction of the Court." Since, in a case of this
kind, where the defendants are known but their whereabouts is unknown, the
legislature has allowed service by publication, our heir will not be put to any
great expense in getting proper notice to the defendants and the title which h
obtains, based upon the court decree, is a marketable title which the vendee must
accept.
It would seem, then, that the procedure outlined above provides a simple,
rather in'expensive method by which titles encumbered by 'missing' heirs can be
made whole. There is no reason for anyone to question such a title. The rules of
service provided by the Action to Quiet Title make the task an easier one, but
they do not lessen the finality of the final decree. The Intestate Act of 1947 is
another aid in this problem for it decreases the possible number of heirs. It is true
that the heirs will still take as tenants in common, but it is also true that that fact
should no longer rise and present an insurmountable barrier to a man who has
thought all along th.,t the whole property was his.
13 Holmes v. Woods, 168 Pa. 530 (1895).
14 Page 338, § 75.
